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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The probate court entered an Amended Final Judgment on
September 26, 2000. Notice of Appeal was filed October 17, 2000.

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
ISSUE ONE
There is no statutory basis for the award of attorney's fees under
the Utah Uniform Probate Code, and the award should be reversed.
STANDARD OF REVIEW This matter of statutory construction
presents an issue of law which the appellate court considers de novo. The
appellate court gives no deference to the trial court on such a question of law,
but is free to reappraise the trial court's legal conclusions. Winegar v. Froerer
Corp., 813 P.2d 104 (Utah 1991). The appellate court reviews the trial
court's legal conclusions for correctness. Schurtz v. BMW of N. Am.r Inc..
814P.2d 1108 (Utah 1991).
WHERE ISSUE PRESERVED IN TEE PROBATE COURT. On
February 4, 1997, the personal representative filed "The Estate's Objection to
and Disallowance of Request for Costs and for Attorney's Fees" arguing that
the Utah Uniform Probate Code contains no provision for an award of
attorney's fees in a proceeding to determine an heir, and that only costs can
be claimed. (R. 664)
ISSUE TWO
The probate court failed to enter findings of fact to support the
large award of attorney's fees, and the case should be remanded for
entry of findings of fact sufficient to facilitate review on appeal.
STANDARD OF REVIEW The threshold question of whether the trial
court'sfindingsof fact in support of an attorney's fee award are sufficiently
detailed to facilitate appellate review is a question of law as to which the
appellate court gives no deference to the trial court. The absence of such
adequatefindingsof fact that are sufficiently detailed "precludes appellate
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review of the evidentiary basis underlying the trial court's decision and
requires remand for more detailed findings by the trial court." Matter of the
Estate of Ouinn. 830 P.2d 282 (Utah App. 1992).
WHERE ISSUE PRESERVED FN THE PROBA TE COURT On
February 1, 1997, the estate filed "The Estate's Objection to Two Proposed
Orders" in which the personal representative argued that the $41,212,50
attorney's fee claim "appears excessive, was not raised at trial, and there is no
showing that Mr. Steffensen's client's are liable to him for the fees." (R. 656)
DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS
UCA Sec. 75-2-109 (1992)

[Addendum]

UCA Sec. 75-2-114(1998)

[Addendum]

UCA Sec 78-45a (1994)

[Addendum]

UCA Sec 78-45a (1997)

[Addendum]

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Kristie Madsen filed a petition to have her daughter Karly Madsen
declared to be an heir. Later Karly Madsen appeared on her own behalf.
The matter was finally settled through stipulated court-ordered DNA
testing, with all parties accepting the results. The probate court awarded
Karly Madsen $41,212.50 in attorney's fees over the estate's objection that
the award was without statutory basis and that the award was excessive.
FACTS
1. Kory Pasquin died on October 26, 1996, at the age of 28 years,
while domiciled in Salt Lake County. (R. 1)
2. As of the date of his death, only one child, Tori Lynn Pasquin, was
listed in the official birth records as his child. No other children were listed
in any official birth record or other official record as his children. (R.2)
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3. Candance M. Souter, the mother of Tori Lynn Pasquin, was
appointed personal representative of The Estate of Kory Pasquin by the Hon.
Tyrone E. Medley, Salt Lake County Probate Judge, on March 4, 1997. (R.8)
4. (>n April 21. Il>97 one knslic Miulsen Ilk' mother of Karly Yvette
Madsen, filed a petition claiming that Kristie Madsen had "a property right in
or a claim against the decedent's estate individually and on behalf of her
inmoi child wlin is iilsiMleu'deiil1, ininoi child " ll'1 II)
5. On May 12, 1997, the personal representative filed a response to
that petition and filed official birth certificates showing that Kory Pasquin
was listed as the father on the birth certificate

asquin dated

February n» : 994, but was not listed as the father in the birth certificate of
•

-

.-.-

N)

6. On May 14, 1997, the Hon. Tyrone E. Medley heard the petition
and referred it to the trial calendar of the Hon. Leslie Lewis. (R.38)

mother Kristie Madsen when she filed the subject petition dated April 21,
1997, filed a "Petitioner's Trial Brief in which they asserted that the minor
child Karlv ^* vettc Madsen was now the petitioner and that .;u-\ • c*. •. <
attorneys. In that trial brief, said attorneys conceded that "(t)he sole factual
issue at trial is whether Karly Yvette Madsen is Kory Pasquin's child." (R.
440) They further conceded that "(t)he petitioner, Karly Madsen, bears the
initial burden of proof in establishing that Kory Pasquin is her father. The
sLinddiil ill |iniiil in nuking ihiii ik'li'imm.iliiiii i • 'In cleai ami UHI\ inung
proof U.C.A. Section 75-2-109(2)(b)."(R. 440) They further conceded
that "(gtenetic test evidence must be based on a proper evidentiary foundation
showing that appropriate procedures were established and routinely followed

to assure reliability in the performance of the tests, chain of custody, etc." (R.
444) (underlined emphasis appears in original trial brief as filed). On that
same date, they also filed a "Petitioner's Motion in Limine" in which they
indicated they intended to introduce the results of some non-court-ordered
DNA testing that had been conducted prior to Kory Pasquin's death. (R.411)
8. On January 26, 1998, the personal representative filed a response to
said motion in limine within her "Consolidated Response to Pending Trial
and Discovery Motions" in which she argued "(s)ince children born out of
wedlock had no right to inherit under the common law, any right of a child
born out of wedlock to inherit from the father is a statutory creation and
applicable statutory procedure must be followed. The applicable procedure is
found at UCA Sec. 78-45a-10 (July 1, 1997) That procedure requires a party
to file a motion and obtain a court order prior to genetic testing." (R. 501)
9. Rather than seeking and obtaining a court-ordered DNA test,
petitioner Karly Madsen elected to proceed with non-court-ordered DNA test,
results arguing in afilingdated January 30, 1998, that "(a) genetic test was in
fact performed in March of 1996 involving the decedent, Karly Madsen, and
her mother, Kristie Madsen. If the appropriate tests for admissibility can be
met... the genetic test will be admissible." (R. 511)
10. Based on Karly Madsen's stated intent to proceed with non-courtordered DNA test results rather than seeking and obtaining a court-ordered
DNA test, the personal representative gave notice that if Karly Madsen
elected to proceed with the non-court-ordered DNA test results rather than
obtaining a court-ordered DNA test, the personal representative would
oppose an award of attorney's fees. "The personal representative has both the
right and the duty to put (Karly Madsen's counsel) to his proof.... Instead
-5-

of simplv ohliiinirij.'. a

-undated by statute (Karly

Madsen's counsel) has done everything he can to get around and avoid the
statute." (Memorandum of the Estate in Opposition to Karly Madsen's
Motion loi \llomev\ I ce>. 1 cbman 6 IWX) (K S27)
11. On November 18, 1998, the Hon. Leslie A. Lewis entered an order
providing that "the admissibility of non-court ordered . . . genetic test results
that Petitioner Karly Madsen seeks to admil mle e\ ulenee in the trial oi thr
matter, will be governed by the normal and usual tests for the admissibility of
such evidence . . . (K (ill (I
12. At the trial of this case, petitioner failed to call any foundation
outpatient laboratory witness who could testify that he or she drew blood

evidence. Instead, the petitioner called a testing laboratory physician who
had received a blood sample from an outpatient laboratory over whom he had
no supervisory responsibility, who testified "I1 m 11oI .11c\i1111A|>CI l hul IIIN
understanding of the chain of custody requirements are so that you can trust

want to make sure that a sample has been in proper custody the entire time.
For instance, in a criminal investigation, if a sample was found at a crime
scene that lln.1 .ample i nuM Iv accounted leu limn the lime the pohee officer
or detective picked it up to the time it eventually got tested by the forensic
laboratory. In normal medical testing we don't trace a blood sample through
as carefully as we do when it is a court ordered test" (T. 253, emphasis
added) When this testing physician was asked whether "at the time this '96
test was performed there was no court order that a test be done9" he
responded "That's correct." (T. 307)
-6-

13. When counsel for petitioner began referring to the non-courtordered DNA test results without first calling any foundation witness from
the outpatient laboratory who could testify that he or she drew blood from the
late Kory Pasquin and then forwarded them to the testing laboratory (for
purposes of establishing a chain of custody of evidence) (and prior to the
admission of those test results into evidence), counsel for the personal
representative objected, and the court secured a commitment from counsel
for petitioner that he would tie it up later. However, counsel for petitioner
failed to call such a foundation witness from the outpatient laboratory, and
the physician who had performed the test testified (as to such a potential "tieup" witness) "I am not their direct supervisor, and my supervisory power, or
whatever, is only that of a contractor. I mean, somebody who is buying
services from the outpatient laboratory and that they're providing those for
us." At that point, counsel for the personal representative again objected:
"Your Honor, briefly, with all due respect to (counsel for petitioner) I didn't
see anyone on his witness list that would be able to tie this up later and so I
am a little concerned about having this witness read something that is not
going to be tied up later." At that point, a bench conference was held at the
conclusion of which counsel for petitioner moves to another subject (T. 263)
14. Even though counsel for Karly Madsen failed to call a foundation
witness from the outpatient laboratory to testify that he or she drew blood
from the late Kory Pasquin (for purposes of establishing a chain of custody
of evidence), the trial court allowed the DNA test results into evidence
without such a foundation witness, over the estate's objection. (T. 272) The
trial jury decided the factual issue of whether Karly Yvette Madsen is Kory
Pasquin's child and heir in favor of paternity and heirship. (R. 636).
-7-

15. Even though Karly Madsen had identified the question of "whether
Karly Yvette Madsen is Kory Pasquin's child" as the "sole factual issue at
trial" and even though there was no finding at the trial that the number of
heirs was limited to two heirs, Karly Madsen mailed a proposed "Final
Judgement" on January 22, 1999, providing that Karly Madsen was "entitled
to one-half of the Kory Pasquin's intestate estate" together with attorney's fees
and costs, interest on such attorney's fees and costs, plus petitioner's
attorney's fees and costs in "collecting" the said judgment. (R. 678) On
January 26, 1998, Karly Madsen's counsel filed an affidavit claiming
attorney's fees in the sum of $41,212.50.
16. The estate filed a timely objection on February 1, 1999, pointing
out that "(w)hether or not Karly Madsen is entitled to one-half of the estate
turns on whether any more claimants come forward claiming to have had a
child fathered by the late Kory Pasquin. That issue was not resolved at trial
and no ruling was made a trial limiting the late Kory Pasquin's children to
two." The estate also indicated in the same filing that it opposed the claim of
attorney's fees as excessive and without legal basis and would file a separate
paper objecting to and disallowing the attorney's fee claim. (R. 656).
17. Three-days later, on February 4, 1999, the estate timely filed "The
Estate's Objection to and Disallowance of Request for Costs and for
Attorney's Fees" in which the estate argued that the Utah Uniform Probate
Code contains no provision for an award of attorney's fees in a proceeding to
determine an heir, and that only costs can be claimed. (R. 664)
18. Said "Final Judgement" was entered on March 2, 1999, over the
estate's objection, providing that Karly Madsen was "entitled to one-half of
-8-

the Kory Pasquin's intestate estate" together with attorney's fees and costs,
interest on such attorney's fees and costs, plus petitioner's attorney's fees and
costs in "collecting" the said judgment. (R. 678)
19. The estate filed a notice of appeal on March 31, 1999. (R. 686)
20. On April 29, 1999, Sheri Marion, the natural mother of Kody Jon
Marion, filed a "Petition for Determination of Additional Heirs and Demand
for Notice" asserting that her child was a third child and heir. (R. 695)
21. On May 19, 1999, Karly Madsen filed an "Objection to
Determination of Additional Heirs and Objection to the Entry of Any Order
Determining Kody Jon Marion to be an Additional Heir of Kory Pasquin and
His Estate" in which Karly Madsen argued that the court had "entered a Final
Judgment on Karly Madsen's claim of paternity wherein the Court decreed
that Karly Madsen is an heir of the Decedent's estate and accordingly is
entitled to one-half of the Decedent's Estate (with the other one-half going to
Tory Lynn Pasquin)." (R. 708)
22. On May 25, 1999, the estate filed an objection to the petition of
Sheri Marion based on a lack of subject matter jurisdiction, since the case
was on appeal of a final order. "The estate timely objected to that final order
in the trial court on the ground that there might be other heirs. The Marion
petition so claims. An appeal of the final order was timely taken by the
estate. The estate will urge reversal on appeal based, inter alia, on that same
ground." (R. 711). On August 11, 1999, the trial court declined to exercise
jurisdiction, writing in a minute entry that "it is decided that until the Court
of Appeals has the final order on the case, this court will not take further
action." (R. 797) On August 24, 1999, the trial court entered an order
awarding attorney's fees in the sum of $41,212.50 to Karly Madsen. (R. 803)
-9-

23. On January 3, 2000, counsel for the personal representative,
counsel for Karly Madsen, and counsel for Sheri Marion filed a stipulation
prepared by counsel for Sheri Marion and signed by all of them. (R. 809).
24. On January 3, 2000, counsel for the personal representative,
counsel for Karly Madsen, and counsel for Sheri Marion filed a joint motion
for court-ordered DNA testing. (R. 811)
25. On January 11, 2000, Judge Leslie A. Lewis signed an order for
court-ordered DNA testing. (R. 813)
26. On March 16, 2000, the estate filed a motion to dismiss the appeal
"without prejudice". Karly Madsen responded with a memorandum on
March 31, 2000, that the appeal should be dismissed "with prejudice". The
estate filed a reply on April 4, 2000, that the appeal should be dismissed
"without prejudice" on the ground, inter alia, that the "Final Judgement"
entered on March 2, 1999, was interlocutory in nature, even though it was
styled as a "Final Judgement" on its face. The Supreme Court granted the
motion to dismiss the appeal "without prejudice" on April 18, 2000. (R. 820)
27. On June 15, 2000, upon receiving the results of the DNA testing
ordered by the court on January 11, 2000, the estate filed "Estate of Kory
Pasquin's Notice of DNA Test Results and Recognition of Heirs" in which
the estate gave notice that said court ordered DNA testing had established
that Karly Madsen and Kody Marion were children of the late Kory Pasquin
and that Sheri Marion is the child of and that based on this DNA test as to
Karly Madsen and Kody Marion and "public records of live births" as to Tory
Pasquin, that Tory Pasquin, Kody Marion, and Karly Madsen are children
and heirs of the late Kory Pasquin." (R. 842)
-10-

28. On June 28, 2000, the Hon. Leslie A. Lewis entered an order
providing that "(p)ursuant to the stipulation of the parties on file herein and
the notice filed by the estate on June 15, 2000, recognizing three (3) persons
as heirs, the court, being sufficiently advised" all prior orders awarding half
of the estate to Karly Madsen were stricken and "there being an unresolved
issue of law" over attorney's fees, no such award is made "at this time
without prejudice to the right to raise and fully brief the issue." (R. 860)
29. On July 27, 2000, Judge Leslie A. Lewis made a minute entry
order vacating her order of June 28, 2000. (R. 937).
30. On September 26, 2000, Judge Leslie A. Lewis entered an
"Amended Final Judgment". (R. 971). On October 17, 2000, the estate
timely filed a notice of appeal of the amended final judgment entered on
September 26, 2000, "and all prior attorneys' fee and cost orders". (R. 860)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
• There is no statutory basis for the attorney's fee award below.
• The case should be remanded for failure to make findings of fact.
ARGUMENT
POINT ONE
There is no statutory basis for the award of attorney's fees under
the Utah Uniform Probate Code, and the award should be reversed.
Kristie Madsen filed her petition to have her daughter Karly Madsen
determined to be an heir on April 21, 1997. The applicable probate code
provision effective on that date appeared at UCA 75-2-109 (1992), a copy of
which is annexed hereto. That provision provided that paternity must be
established by clear and convincing evidence, but it did not contain any
provision for attorney's fees, nor did it contain any reference to the Uniform
-11-

Act on Paternity appearing at Chapter 45a of Title 78 (1994) of the Utah
Code. The trial of Kristie Madsen's petition was scheduled for January 26,
1998. Trial preparation was done with an eye on that date, including, but not
limited trial subpoena service and return of service by the estate. (R. 489)
Ten calendar days before that trial date, on January 16, 1998, the
pretrial was held. (R. 487) Due to a conflict in the court's calendar, the court
ordered the trial continued for four months to May 26, 1998. The court
entered and mailed an order (R. 486) on January 20, 1998, continuing the
trial to May 26, 1998. As the parties had already prepared for trial and
pretried the case on January 16, 1998, the judge ruled "(n)o further pretrial is
needed." (R. 487) Between January 16, 1998, and May 22, 1998, motion,
discovery, and other issues were addressed. ((R. 487 through R. 575)
On May 22, 1998, a scheduling conference was held in which the
court continued the May 26, 1998, trial date to September 1, 1998. (R. 576)
There were no further court filings after May 22, 1998, through July 1,
1998. Effective July 1, 1998, the Utah Uniform Probate code was amended.
The new applicable probate code provision effective on that date
appeared at UCA 75-2-114 (1998), a copy of which is annexed hereto.
That new applicable provision also did not contain any provision for
attorney's fees, but it did contain a reference to the Uniform Act on Paternity,
appearing at Chapter 45a of Title 78 (1997) of the Utah Code. Thus, from
the time that Kristie Madsen filed her petition on April 21, 1997 (R. 11), until
the law was changed effective July 1, 1998, there was no basis in the Utah
. Uniform Probate Code for an attorney's fee award. There was no basis for an
award after that date unless the court construes the reference from the Utah
Uniform Probate Code to the Uniform Act on Paternity to incorporate an
-12-

attorney's fee provision by reference. This presents an issue of first
impression in Utah. Furthermore, the petition filed by Kristie Madsen on
April 21, 1997, did not pray for attorney's fees. Interestingly, Kristie Madsen
continued to participate in this probate until August 14, 1997, the last date on
which she filed something on behalf of her daughter. (R. 74). Without
explanation, on August 27, 1997, her attorney, David W. Steffensen, caused
a paper to be filed in which he indicated he was counsel for both Kristie
Madsen and Karly Madsen. (R. 82). Then, on August 29, 1997, again
without explanation to the court or to the personal representative, David W.
Steffensen began signing papers as attorney for Karly Madsen only. (R. 84).
On January 16, 1998, Karly Madsen filed a motion for attorney's fees
pursuant to UCA Sec. 78-45a-5(4). (R. 404) As set forth above, the
applicable Utah Uniform Probate Code provision then in effect contained no
reference to the Uniform Act on Paternity at Chapter 45 a of Title 78.
Accordingly, none of the attorney's fees incurred by Kristie Madsen
from April 21, 1997, through August 14, 1997, should be awarded to Karly
Madsen. None of Karly Madsen's attorney's fees incurred by her between
August 14, 1997, and July 1, 1998, should be awarded to her because there
was no statutory basis for same in effect during that period of time or in
effect when she filed her motion for attorney's fees on January 16, 1998.
As far as attorney's fees incurred by Karly Madsen from and after July
1, 1998, the court should rule that the reference in the Utah Uniform Probate
Code to the Uniform Act on Paternity should not be construed to incorporate
a fee-shifting provision by reference, since, on a matter of such importance,
the legislature would have placed the fee-shifting provision in the applicable
portion of the Utah Uniform Probate Code itself had it intended to do this.
-13-

If the court construes a fee-shifting provision by reference, then no
award of attorney's fees should be made, because no motion for attorney's
fees was filed after the change in the law on July 1, 1998, provided a basis.
For any and all of the foregoing reasons, the attorney fee award should
be reversed as having no basis in law or in the record. If the court construes
a fee-shifting provision by reference and also concludes that Karly Madsen is
entitled to a fee award under this record, no fees should be awarded for fees
incurred prior to July 1, 1998, the date the law changed. If the court decides
the change in law was retroactive, no fees should be awarded for fees
incurred during the period of time prior to the date Kristie Madsenfiledher
motion for attorney's on January 16, 1998, the date of the pretrial conference.
This is significant, since trial preparation was already so complete on
January 16, 1998, that the probate court ruled that no further pretrial was
needed, and since this was the date on which the estate first received notice
by courtfilingthat Karly Madsen was seeking attorney's fees.
The fee award of $41,212.50 should be reversed and remanded for
entry by the trial court of an award consistent with the appellate court's
rulings on the law, and in any event, the fee award of $41,212.50 should be
reversed and remanded for entry by the trial court offindingsof fact that are
sufficient to facilitate appellate review of the reasonableness of the fee.
POINT TWO
The probate court failed to enter findings of fact to support the
large award of attorney's fees, and the case should be remanded for
entry of findings of fact sufficient to facilitate review on appeal.
The threshold question of whether the trial court'sfindingsof fact in
support of an attorney's fee award are sufficiently detailed and include
-14-

enough subsidiary facts to facilitate appellate review is a question of law as
to which the appellate court gives no deference to the trial court. In resolving
a dispute over an attorney's fee award, the trial court should have made and
entered findings that are sufficiently detailed and that include enough
subsidiary facts to disclose to the appellate court the manner in which the
trial court applied the following four-step process: 1) Determination of
"exactly" what legal work the petitioning attorney performed both in terms of
the nature of the work and the time spent in its performance; 2)
Determination of "how much of that work was reasonably necessary" to
adequately conclude the representation; 3) Determination of the
reasonableness of the hourly rate charged; and 4) Finally, after a "preliminary
fee" has been established by applying the first three steps, the court should
then apply the various criteria that are set forth in Rule of Professional
Conduct 1.5- Fees. The absence of adequatefindingsof fact that are
sufficiently detailed and that include enough subsidiary facts to disclose to
the appellate court the steps by which the trial court applied, analyzed, and
then resolved each one of these four requirements "precludes appellate review
of the evidentiary basis underlying the trial court's decision and requires
remand for more detailed findings by the trial court." Matter of the Estate of
Quinnr 830 P.2d 282 (Utah App. 1992).
The award of $41,212.50 appears excessive on its face and the estate
objected to it as appearing excessive. Yet, the trial court entered no findings
of fact supporting such a large fee award. This leaves both the personal
representative and the appellate court unable to evaluate whether the award is
reasonable. A remand for more detailed findings of fact will allow the
personal representative to evaluate thosefindingsin order to determine
-15-

whether or not she should seek further appellate review, and, if so, to pursue
such further appellate review in a manner that is consistent with her fiduciary
duties and in a manner reasonably calculated to benefit the estate.
It appears that preparing for and trying a paternity claim where one
already has a DNA test in-hand should cost no more than $5,000, not
$41,212.50. This high award occurred when the court awarded fees that
were not incurred in pursuing the heirship claim, but were incurred in filings
by Karly Madsen and Kristie Madsen pertaining to estate administration, not
heirship, which were never litigated to a conclusion. There was no statutory
basis for awarding these non-heirship fees, or, in the alternative, since they
were never litigated to a conclusion, there was no factual and legal basis for
designation of a prevailing party to whom attorney's fees could be awarded.
As set forth above, there were a number of filings related to estate
administration initiated by Karly Madsen and Kristie Madsen as to which no
court determination was ever made. There were other matters related to heirs
as to which Karly Madsen initially prevailed but later did not prevail (such as
her insistence that she was entitled to half of the estate). A fee award under a
statute should only be awarded for those matters litigated to a conclusion via
judicial decision in which the party claiming the award ultimately prevailed.
Attorney's fees incurred or expended on matters which were not
concluded by a judicial determination should not be awarded under a feeshifting statute. Buckhannon Board and Care Home v. West Virginia, No.
99-1848 (U.S. Supreme Court, May 30, 2001). "A defendant's voluntary
change in conduct, although perhaps accomplishing what the plaintiff sought
to achieve by the lawsuit, lacks the necessary judicial imprimatur on the
change" (Rehnquist, C.J.) "One does not prevail in a suit that is never
-16-

determined." (Scalia, J., concurring.) These principles are especially
applicable in this case, where the prolixfilingsby Karly Madsen and Kristie
Madsen related to estate administration rather than Karly Madsen's status as
an heir never resulted in a judicial determination and where most of the
heirship issues were ultimately settled rather than judicially decided. Further,
the "Final Judgement" which provided the basis for the award of $41,212.50
erroneously provided that Karly Madsen was entitled to one-half of the estate,
even though no determination had been made that there were only two heirs.
The court later entered an "Amended Final Judgement" that recognized
three heirs and did not foreclose the possibility of even more children to be
recognized as additional heirs in the future. Yet, the trial court applied "law
of the case" to reinstate the earlier $41,212.50 that it had vacated, even
though there had been this subsequent change and Karly Madsen no longer
prevailed on that point. Based on this change in the operative facts, the
doctrine of "law of the case" should not have been applied and the court
should either have modified the $41,212.50 or entered findings of fact
justifying the absence of modification in light of the change in facts.
As set forth Matter of the Estate of Quinn, 830 P.2d 282 (Utah App.
1992), the reasonableness of the fee must be weighed against the overall
amount involved, pursuant to Rule of Professional Conduct 1.5 - Fees.
While the personal representative has been successful in defending the
estate against lawsuits and claims in which third parties either claimed
ownership of a significant portion of estate property or asserted personal
injury claims arising out of the boating accident at Lake Powell in which
Kory Pasquin was killed, the personal representative has, so far, been unable
to get this $41,212.50 attorney's fee award reversed, and it is so large that it
-17-

now predominates this entire probate. Absent a finding by the trial court of
the value of the property left by Kory Pasquin, no measure can be made of
the reasonableness of that $41,212.50 fee claim against the amount involved.
This raises another matter in which the trial court's failure to enter
findings of fact and conclusions of law thwarts evaluation of the award by
the personal representative and appellate review. The personal representative
must distribute estate assets in the following order under UCA Sec. 75-3-805:
(a) reasonable funeral expenses;
(b) costs and expenses of administration;
(c) debts and taxes with preference under federal law;
(d) medical and hospital expenses of the last illness;
(e) debts and taxes with preference under the laws of this state;
(f) all other claims;
(g) a pro rata distribution of the remainder to the three heirs identified
so far plus any additional children of Kory Pasquin who may be identified.
The absence of detailed findings of fact and conclusions of law creates
confusion as to whether the $41,212.50 is to be paid under (f) ahead of the
distribution to the heirs or is, instead, to be paid in conjunction with a pro
rata distribution to the heirs under (g), since it is going to an heir and since it
is being awarded in connection with a determination of that heir's heirship.
The $41,212.50 should be reversed and remanded for entry of detailed
findings of fact and conclusions of law indicating whether the fee award, if
any, is to be paid by the personal representative under (f) or under (g).
There has also been no finding (or any showing on which to base such
a finding) that if the $41,212.50 is not awarded against the estate assets, then
Karly Madsen's attorneys will take this out of her share of the estate to satisfy
-18-

their claim against her for attorney's fees or that she will otherwise be liable
to them for the $41,212.50. This is significant, since actual liability on the
part of the client and an actual expectation by the attorney that he or she will
collect from the client serves as a healthy check and balance against incurring
excessive fees. Such a check and balance is not present if the attorney is
taking the case on a flier with an expectation that he will not be paid unless
he can get an attorney's fee award from the other side. In that case, neither
the attorney nor the client have an incentive to keep the fees reasonable.
Once the matter is remanded to the trial court and that court makes
detailed findings of fact, it is possible that the trial court will use that exercise
to weed-out all of Karly Madsen and Kristie Madsen's fees for litigation they
initiated related to estate administration (which they never concluded and as
to which there is not even a colorable statutory basis for a fee award) from
fees that relate to determination of heirship. The heirship fees should not
amount to all that much. There were already DNA test results on file at the
University of Utah that related to Kory Pasquin. When the University of
Utah's counsel resisted Kristie Madsen's subpoena duces tecum to get those
test results, the personal representative joined with Kristie Madsen in a joint
motion for an order for their release to counsel for both sides. (R. 84)
Once those records were released, it appeared that there were flaws
that made them less than "clear and convincing" and a legal issue arose as to
whether non-court-ordered DNA test results were entitled to the deference
granted under UCA Sec. 75-2-114 (1998) where the standard of proof is
clear and convincing evidence, when, pursuant to UCA Sec. 78-45a-6.5
(1997), such deference should be given only where a preponderance standard
is being applied. Viafilingswith the court related to that issue, the personal
-19-

representative encouraged Kristie Madsen to get a second court-ordered DNA
test rather than relying on the non-court-ordered test results. As was her
tactical and strategic right, she elected to proceed with the non-court-ordered
test results. (She knew that those results indicated paternity and she did not
know what a new court-ordered DNA test would say. Also, it would likely
be a little less expensive to simply subpoena a foundation witness from the
outpatient laboratory to give an evidentiary foundation for the existing test
results rather than opening Kory Pasquin's grave and obtaining a courtordered test. Also, the opening of Kory Pasquin's grave to obtain a courtordered test would probably upset the family, something that the personal
representative was also sensitive to and happy to avoid if at all feasible.)
At that point, it was a rather simple matter for Karly Madsen to simply
secure a trial date and subpoena a foundation witness. Inexplicably, no such
witness was subpoenaed, further reducing legal fees over what they would
have been had one been subpoenaed. None of this was novel, complex, or
time-consuming, and could all have been easily done for well-under $5,000.
When the "Final Judgement" erroneously awarded one-half of the
estate to Karly Madsen, and when Karly Madsen resisted efforts to correct
that obvious error (and the probate judge also failed to honor the estate's
objection and correct the obvious error), it was reasonable and prudent for the
estate to duly appeal thatfinaljudgment. Karly Madsen finally conceded that
point, and so she is not entitled to that portion of the $41,212.50 expended in
securing that erroneous order. As long as there was going to be an appeal,
there was also a good faith basis to appeal the decision to give the kind of
deference to a non-court-ordered test that is reserved in the statute for a courtordered test and to appeal the decision by the trial judge to initially indicate
-20-

he was going to require a foundation witness from the outpatient lab and to
then decide against that requirement when Karly Madsen couldn't produce
one. Of all of the issues, only the issue over the $41,212.50 remains, since
Karly Madsen finally abandoned her efforts to hang-on to half of the estate
and also stipulated to court-ordered DNA testing which could be done
utilizing Kody Marion's DNA and the DNA already at the University of Utah
belonging to Kory Pasquin. This would not only determine the issue of Kody
Marion's paternity, but, in the even that it found paternity as to him, it would
also moot all of the lingering factual and evidentiary issues surrounding the
non-court-ordered DNA test. It did just that and those issues were settled.
In light of all of this, detailed trial court findings of fact are needed.
CONCLUSION
A reversal of the $41,212.50 attorney's fee award as having no basis in
statute will leave that much more property for the minor children who are the
heirs. To the extent that the appellate court concludes it has a basis in statute,
the fee award should be reversed and remanded for the entry of findings of
fact that are sufficiently detailed and that include enough subsidiary facts to
disclose to the appellate court the steps by which the probate court applied,
analyzed, and then resolved eachpne of the^qur requirements that are set
forth in Matter of the Estffle c/OuAjlO
DATED THIS y

P.2jjl 282 (Utah App. 1992).

/DAY OF JUNE, i001.

RO^EElW^OPIER
Attorney for Candance M. Souter,
Personal Representative, Estate of Kory Pasquin
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Addendum
UCA Sec. 75-2-109(1992)
UCA Sec. 75-2-114(1998)
UCA Sec 78-45a (1994)
UCA Sec 78-45a (1997)
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75-2-109

75-2-107. Kindred of half blood.
Relatives of the half blood inherit the same share they would inherit if they
were of the whole blood.
History: C. 1953, 75-2-107, enacted by L.
1975, ch. 150, § 3.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
"Of the blood."
Phrase "of the blood" under former succession statute included the half blood as well as
the whole blood, and excluded only those who
had none of the blood of the ancestor from
whom the estate came; where a mother died
leaving children as the issue of two marriages,

and had taken by inheritance property belonging to a deceased son, such property was properly distributed among his half brothers and
sisters and their descendants, as well as
brothers and sisters of the whole blood. Gardner's Estate v. Gardner, 42 Utah 40,129 P. 360
(1912).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 23 Am. Jur. 2d Descent and
Distribution § 54.
C.J.S. — 26A C.J.S. Descent and Distribution § 36.
A.L.R. — Descent and distribution: rights of

inheritance as between kindred of whole and
half blood, 47 A.L.R.4th 561.
Key Numbers. — Descent and Distribution
«=» 35.

75-2-108. Afterborn heirs.
Relatives of the decedent conceived before his death but born thereafter
inherit as if they had been born in the lifetime of the decedent.
History: C. 1953, 75-2-108, enacted by L.
1975, ch. 150, § 3.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 23 Am. Jur. 2d Descent and
Distribution §§ 94 to 96.
C.J.S. — 26A C.J.S. Descent and Distribution § 29.
A.L.R. — Pretermitted heir statutes: what

constitutes sufficient testamentary reference
to, or evidence of contemplation of, heir to render statute inapplicable, 83 A.L.R.4th 779.
Key Numbers. — Descent and Distribution
«= 27.

75-2-109. Meaning of child and related terms.
If, for purposes of intestate succession, a relationship of parent and child
must be established to determine succession by, through, or from a person:
(1) An adopted person is the child of an adopting parent and not of the
natural or previously-adopting parents except that adoption of a child by
the spouse of a natural or previously-adopting parent has no effect on the
relationship between the child and that natural or previously-adopting
parent.
(2) In cases not covered by Subsection (1), a person born out of wedlock
is a child of the mother. That person is also a child of the father, if:
31
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(a) The natural parents participated in a marriage ceremony before or after the birth of the child, even though the attempted marriage is void; or
(b) The paternity is established by an adjudication before the
death of the father or is established thereafter by clear and convincing proof, except that the paternity established under this subsection
is ineffective to qualify the father or his kindred to inherit from or
through the child unless the father has openly treated the child as his
and has not refused to support the child.
tion of "child" and "parent" in § 75-1-201 incorporates the meanings established by this
section, thus extending them for all purposes of
the Code. See § 75-2-803 for the definition of
"spouse" for purposes of intestate succession.
Cross-References. — Filing notice of claim
of paternity, § 78-30-4.8.
Marriage in belief that former spouse was
dead or divorced, issue legitimate, § 30-1-3.

History: C. 1953, 75-2-109, enacted by L.
1975, ch. 150, § 3; 1977, ch. 194, § 5; 1992,
ch. 30, § 153.
Amendment Notes. — The 1992 amendment, effective April 27, 1992, revised the subsection designations by deleting "(1)" from the
beginning and substituting number designations for lower-case letters and made other stylistic changes throughout the section.
Editorial Board Comment. — The defini-

NOTES TO DECISIONS
rington case, held that an adopted child could
inherit in a dual capacity, that is from both
natural and adopting parents. In re Benner's
Estate, 109 Utah 172,166 P.2d 257 (1946). In a
still later case, the court declined to overrule
Harrington and held that adopted children did
not inherit from their adoptive parents' relatives. In re Smith's Estate, 7 Utah 2d 405, 326
P.2d 400 (1958).
Inter vivos trust, created in 1956, naming
issue of settlor's two sons as beneficiaries, did
not include an adopted son since an adopted
child could not inherit from parents of his
adoptive parents; and the settlor, by using the
term "issue," indicated that he did not intend
to include adopted children as beneficiaries.
Makoff v. Makoff, 528 P.2d 797 (Utah 1974)
(decided under former Probate Code).

ANALYSIS

Constitutionality.
Acknowledgment by father.
Adopted children.
Burden of proof.
Conflict of laws.
Issue of illegitimate.
Right of illegitimate to inherit.
Constitutionality.
This section, which permits a mother to inherit from her illegitimate child under all circumstances but requires a father to meet additional criteria by demonstrating that he has
openly treated the child as his own and has not
refused to support the child before he may inherit, does not violate constitutional due process and equal rights provisions. Scheller v.
Pessetto, 783 P.2d 70 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
Acknowledgment by father.
What acts amounted to acknowledgment
contemplated by former statute permitting inheritance by illegitimates if acknowledged by
father depended upon facts and circumstances
of each particular case. Rohwer v. District
Court, 41 Utah 279, 125 P. 671 (1912); Harrison v. Harker, 44 Utah 541, 142 P. 716 (1914).
Adopted children.
Under former succession statute, "issue" was
held not to include adopted children with result that they could not inherit through their
adoptive parents. In re Harrington's Estate, 96
Utah 252, 85 P.2d 630, 120 A.L.R. 830 (1938).
However, in a subsequent case under the same
statute the court, without referring to the Har-

Burden of proof.
Illegitimate child claiming as heir under former acknowledgment statute had burden of
proving natural parentage and unambiguous
acknowledgment by deceased. In re Roberts'
Estate, 69 Utah 548, 256 P. 1068 (1927); In re
Newell's Estate, 78 Utah 463, 5 P.2d 230
(1931).
Conflict of laws.
Under former Probate Code, issue of illegitimate child whose domicile was in Illinois and
who under Illinois law could not inherit property from father's line due to lack of later marriage between mother and father could not inherit from father's relative in Utah despite fact
that had the domicile of the purported heirs
been Utah, the issue would have taken under
Utah law; if the law of the domicile found a
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75-2-201

enacted by Laws 1975, ch. 150, § 3, relating to
dower and curtesy abolished, and enacts the
present section, effective July 1, 1 998.

75-2-114. Parent and child relationship.
(1) Except as provided in Subsections (2) and (3), for purposes of intestate
succession by, through, or from a person, an individual is the child of the
individual's natural parents, regardless of their marital status. The parent anc
child relationship may be established as provided in Sections 78-45a-7
78-45a-10, and Title 78, Chapter 45a, Uniform Act on Paternity.
(2) An adopted individual is the child of the adopting parent or parents anc
not of the natural parents, but adoption of a child by the spouse of eithei
natural parent has no effect on:
(a) the relationship between the child and t h a t n a t u r a l parent; or
(b) the right of the child or a descendant of the child to inherit from oi
through the other natural parent.
(3) Inheritance from or through a child by either n a t u r a l parent or his
kindred is precluded unless t h a t natural parent has openly treated the child ai
his, and has not refused to support the child.
History: C. 1953, 75-2-114, enacted by L.
1998, ch. 39, § 22.
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws
1998, ch. 39, § 22 repeals former § 75-2-114, as

enacted by Laws 1983, ch. 226, § 1, relating tc
person related to decedent through two lines o;
relationship, and enacts the present section
effective July 1, 1998.

PART 2
ELECTIVE SHARE OF SURVIVING SPOUSE
75-2-201.

Definitions.

As used in this part:
(1) "Decedent's nonprobate transfers to others," as used in sections
other t h a n Section 75-2-205, means the amounts t h a t are included in the
augmented estate under Section 75-2-205.
(2) "Fractional interest in property held in joint tenancy with the righl
of survivorship," whether the fractional interest is unilaterally severable
or not, means the fraction, the numerator of which is one and t h |
denominator of which, if the decedent was a joint tenant, is one plus the
number of joint tenants who survive the decedent and which, if the
decedent was not a joint tenant, is the number of joint tenants.
(3) "Marriage," as it relates to a transfer by the decedent during
marriage, means any marriage of the decedent to the decedent's surviving
spouse.
(4) "Nonadverse party" means a person who does not have a substantia
beneficial interest in the trust or other property arrangement t h a t would
be adversely affected by the exercise or nonexercise of the power that the
person possesses respecting the trust or other property arrangement. A
person having a general power of appointment over property is considered
to have a beneficial interest in the property.
(5) "Power" or "power of appointment" includes a power to designate thj
beneficiary of a beneficiary designation.
(6) "Presently exercisable general power of appointment" means 8
power of appointment under which, at the time in question, the decedent
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person shall mail a copy of the affidavit and a copy of the pleading 01
stipulation to the Office of the Attorney General, Child Suppon
Division.
(iii) If notice is not given in accordance with this subsection, the
office is not bound by any decision, judgment, agreement, or compro
mise rendered in the action.
(c) If IV-D services have been or are being provided, that person shall
join the office as a party to the action, or mail or deliver a written request
to the Office of the Attorney General, Child Support Division asking the
office to join as a party to the action. A copy of that request, along with
proof of service, shall be filed with the court. The office shall be represented as provided in Subsection (l)(b).
(3) Neither the attorney general nor the county attorney represents or has
an attorney-client relationship with the obligee or the obligor in carrying out
the duties under this chapter.
History: L. 1957, ch. 110, § 9; 1975, ch. 96,
§ 23; 1977, ch. 145, § 11; 1982, ch. 63, § 2;
1989, ch. 62, § 23; 1990, ch. 183, § 59; 1994,
ch. 140, § 15; 1995, ch. 258, § 15.
Amendment Notes. — The 1994 amendment, effective May 2, 1994, rewrote Subsection (2)(a) which read "A person may not commence any action or file a pleading to establish
or modify a support obligation or to recover
support due or owing, whether under this chapter or any other applicable statute, without
filing an affidavit with the court at the time the
action is commenced or the pleading is filed
stating whether public assistance has been or is
being provided on behalf of a dependent child of
the person commencing the action or filing the
pleading"; added the designation for Subsection
(2Kb) and the second sentence in the subsection; redesignated former Subsection (2)(b) as
Subsection (2)(c) and added the language be-

ginning "or mail or deliver" at the end of the
first sentence and inserted the second sentence
therein; deleted former Subsection (3) which
read "As used in this section 'office' means the
Office of Recovery Services within the Department of Human Services"; and added Subsection (3).
The 1995 amendment, effective May 1,1995,
substituted "child support services have been
or are being provided under Part IV of the
Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C, Section 601 et
seq." for "public assistance has been or is being
provided" in Subsection (2)(b)(i) and (2)(b)(ii);
added "of the Attorney General, Child Support
Division" at the end of Subsection (2)(b)(ii) and
in Subsection (2)(c); added Subsection
(2)(bXiii); substituted "IV-D services have been
or are" for "public assistance has been or is" in
Subsection (2)(c); and made numerous stylistic
changes.

CHAPTER 45a
UNIFORM ACT ON PATERNITY
Section
78-45a-2.
78-45a-5.

78-45a-l.

Determination of paternity —
Effect — Enforcement.
Remedies.

Section
78-45a-7.
78-45a-10.
78-45a-10.5.

Authority for genetic testing.
Effect of genetic test results.
Visitation rights of father.

Obligations of the father.
NOTES TO DECISIONS

Action for reimbursement.
— Collateral estoppel.
The trial court properly denied mother's request for reimbursement of past child support
under the doctrine of equitable estoppel, finding that she had made statements and took
actions that led the father to conclude that she

wanted nothing to do with him and didn't want
his support, that it was reasonable for the
father to rely on her statements and actions,
and that, in reliance on her statements and
actions, the father had married and incurred
additional expenses. State, Dep't of Human
Servs. ex rel. Parker v. Irizarry, 262 Utah Adv.
Rep. 21 (Utah Ct. App. 1995).
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45a-2. Determination of paternity — Effect — Enforcement.
) Paternity may be determined upon:
(a) the petition of the mother, child, putative father, or the public
authority chargeable by law with the support of the child; or
(b) a voluntary declaration of paternity executed in accordance with
Chapter 45e, Voluntary Declaration of Paternity Act.
) If paternity has been determined or has been acknowledged according to
laws of this state or any other state, the liabilities of the father may be
reed in the same or other proceedings by:
(a) the mother, child, or the public authority that has furnished or may
furnish the reasonable expenses of pregnancy, confinement, education,
necessary support, or funeral expenses; and
(b) other persons including private agencies to the extent that the;7
lave furnished the reasonable expenses of pregnancy, confinement, eduction, necessary support, or funeral expenses.
tory: L. 1965, ch. 158, § 2; 1990, ch.
23; 1994, ch. 127, § 2.
'ndment Notes. — The 1994 amendeffective May 2, 1994, designated the
ntence as Subsection (1), adding Subsec-

5a-5.

tion (1Kb), and designated the second sentence
as Subsection (2), making related stylistic
changes and inserting "or any other state" in
the introductory language

Remedies.

The district court has jurisdiction of an action to establish paternity. All
lies for enforcement of judgments for expenses of pregnancy and confinefor a wife or for education, necessary support, or funeral expenses for
nate children shall apply. The court has continuing jurisdiction to modify
ike a judgment for future education and necessary support. All remedies
Title 77, Chapter 31, Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act,
ailable for enforcement of duties of support under this act.
a) The obligee may enforce his right of support against the obligor and
e Department of Human Services may proceed on behalf of the obligee
in its own behalf, pursuant to the provisions of Title 62A, Chapter 11,
enforce that right of support against the obligor.
(b) The provisions of Title 62A, Chapter 11, apply in all actions by the
partment.
c) Whenever the department commences an action under this chapter,
shall be the duty of the attorney general or the county attorney of the
mty where the obligee resides to represent the department. Neither the
orney general nor the county attorney represents or has an attorneymt relationship with the obligee or the obligor, in carrying out his
ponsibilities under this chapter.
he court may enter an order awarding costs, attorney fees, and witness
the manner prescribed by Section 30-3-3 upon a judgment or acknowlit of paternity.
he provisions of Rule 55, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, apply to
ty actions commenced under this chapter.
y\ L. 1965, ch. 158, § 5; 1975, ch. 96,
0, ch. 183, § 60; 1992, ch. 160, § 2;
137, § 16; 1994, ch. 140, § 16.
ment Notes. — The 1992 amend-

ment, effective July 1, 1992, in Subsection (1),
divided the former first sentence into two sentences, substituted "action to establish paternity" for "action under this act" at the end of the
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present first sentence, and added the title and
chapter citation to the reference in the last
sentence; in Subsection (2), substituted the
reference to Title 62A, Chapter 11 for "Chapter
45b of this title"in the first and second sentences; designated the former last sentence of
Subsection (2) as Subsection (3) and substituted "the department commences an action
under this act" for "a court action is commenced
by the state Department of Human Services" in
that subsection; and made stylistic changes
throughout the section.

78-45a-:

The 1993 amendment, effective May 3,19J
deleted the (3) designation formerly before t
present last sentence in Subsection (2) a
added present Subsection (3).
The 1994 amendment, effective May 2,191
subdivided Subsection (2); substituted "eh*
terw for "act" in the first sentence and added t
second sentence in Subsection (2)(c); add
Subsection (4); and made stylistic changes,
Meaning of "this act.* — The phrase "tl
act" in Subsection (1) refers to Laws 1965, <
158, which enacted §§ 78-45a-l to 78-45a-l'

78-45a-7. Authority for genetic testing.
(1) Upon motion of any party to the action, made at a time so as not to del;
the proceedings unduly, the court shall order the mother, the child, and ti
alleged father to submit to genetic testing.
(2) The court may, upon its own initiative or upon request made by or <
behalf of any person whose blood is involved, order the mother, the child, ai
the alleged father to submit to genetic testing.
(3) If any party refuses to submit to those tests, the court may resolve t]
question of paternity against that party, or may enforce its order if the righ
of others and the interests of justice so require.
History: L. 1965, ch. 158, § 7; 1992, ch.
160, § 3.
Amendment Notes. — The 1992 amendment, effective July 1, 1992, added the subsection designations; divided the former first sen-

tence into two sentences, reversing their ore1
and substituting "genetic testing" for "bio
tests" in both subsections and "request" j
"suggestion" in Subsection (2); and made styl
tic changes throughout the section.

78-45a-10. Effect of genetic test results,
(1) If the court finds that the conclusions of all experts, as disclosed by t]
evidence based upon the tests, are that the alleged father is not the father
the child, the question of paternity shall be resolved accordingly.
(2) If the experts conclude that the genetic tests show the possibility of tl
alleged father's paternity, admission of that evidence is within the discretion
the court.
(3) (a) A man is presumed to be the natural father of a child if genel
testing results in a paternity index of at least 100.
(b) A presumption under this subsection may be rebutted in an appi
priate action only by clear and convincing evidence.
(4) (a) Except as provided in Subsection (b), the court may receive tes
mony and genetic test results from genetic testing experts and othe
involved in conducting the genetic tests in the form of an affidavit.
(b) If any party objects to the court's receipt of the testimony or te
results in affidavit form, that party may file a written objection with t]
court. The objection shall be filed within 30 days after service of t]
written test results on that party. Failure to timely file an objection und
this subsection constitutes a waiver of that objection.
History: L. 1965, ch. 158, § 10; 1992, ch.
160, § 4.
Amendment Notes. — The 1992 amendment, effective July 1, 1992, designated the
former first and third sentences as Subsections

(1) and (2), respectively; deleted the forn
second sentence which read: "If the expe:
disagree in their findings or conclusions, t
question shall be submitted upon all the e
dence"; substituted "genetic tests" for "blc

8-45a-10.5
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ists,* deleted "depending upon the infrequency
r
the blood type" from the end, and made a

stylistic change in Subsection (2); and added
Subsections (3) and (4).

8-45a-10.5. Visitation rights of father.
(1) If the court determines that the alleged father is the father, it may upon
s own motion or upon motion of the father, order visitation rights in
xordance with Sections 30-3-32 through 30-3-37 as it considers appropriate
ider the circumstances.
(2) Visitation rights may not be granted to a father if the child has been
bsequently adopted.
listory: C. 1953, 78-45a-10.5, enacted by
1994, ch. 29, § 1.
effective Dates. — Laws 1994, ch. 29 be-

came effective on May 2, 1994, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.

CHAPTER 45c
UNIFORM CHILD CUSTODY
JURISDICTION
ion
5c-8.

Misconduct of petitioner as basis for refusing jurisdiction —
Notice to another jurisdiction
— Ordering petitioner to appear in other court or to return child — Awarding costs.

Section
78-45c-15.

Filing foreign decree — Effect
— Enforcement — Award of
expenses.

45c-l. Purposes — Construction.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ted in Crump v. Crump, 821 P.2d 1172
i Ct. App. 1991).
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
JEL — Home state jurisdiction of court
§ 3(aXD of the Uniform Child Custody
liction Act (UCCJA) or the Parental Kid-

napping Prevention Act (PKPA), 28 USCS
§ 1738A(cX2XA), 6 A.L.R.5th 1.

t5c-2. Definitions.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS
ly proceeding.
ly proceeding.
itary termination of adoptive father's

parental rights in, and obligations to, child was
not custody issue under this chapter. T.B. v.
M.M.J., 278 Utah Adv. Rep. 16 (Utah Ct. App.
1995).
Cited in Crump v. Crump, 821 P.2d 1172
(Utah Ct. App. 1991).
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(4) (a) The advisory committee shall review the child support guidelines tc
ensure their application results in the determination of appropriate chile
support award amounts.
(b) The committee shall report to the Legislative Judiciary Interiir
Committee on or before October 1 in 1989 and 1991, and then on or before
October 1 of every fourth year subsequently.
(c) The committee's report shall include recommendations of the major
ity of the committee, as well as specific recommendations of individua
members of the committee.
(5) (a) (i) Members who are not government employees shall receive nc
compensation or benefits for their services, but may receive per dien
and expenses incurred in the performance of the member's officia
duties at the rates established by the Division of Finance unde]
Sections 63A-3-106 and 63A-3-107.
(ii) Members may decline to receive per diem and expenses for theii
service,
(b) (i) State government officer and employee members who do no
receive salary, per diem, or expenses from their agency for theii
service may receive per diem and expenses incurred in the perfor
mance of their official duties from the committee at the rates estab
lished by the Division of Finance under Sections 63A-3-106 anc
63A-3-107.
(ii) State government officer and employee members may decline t<
receive per diem and expenses for their service.
(6) Staff for the committee shall be provided from the existing budgets of th<
Department of Human Services.
(7) The committee ceases to exist no later than the date the subsequen
committee under this section is appointed.
History: C. 1953,78-45-7.13, enacted by L.
1989, ch. 214, § 15; 1990, ch. 183, § 58; 1994,
ch. 118, § 14; 1996, ch. 243, § 195; 1997, ch.
233, § 1.
Amendment Notes. — The 1997 amendment, effective May 5, 1997, substituted "one
representative" for "two representatives" in

Subsections (l)(a) and (1Kb); added new Sut
sections (l)(d) and (l)(e), renumbering accord
ingly; substituted "three" for "five" in Subsec
tion (l)(f); and deleted "and the Judicia
Council" after "Department of Human Services
in Subsection (6).

78-45-7.22. Social security number in court records.
The social security number of any individual who is subject to a suppor
order shall be placed in the records relating to the matter.
History: C. 1953,78-45-7.22, enacted by L.
1997, ch. 232, § 73.

Effective Dates. — Laws 1997, ch. 235
§ 142 makes the act effective on July 1, 1997
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J-45a-2. Determination of paternity — Effect — Enforcement.
1) Paternity may be determined upon:
(a) the petition of the mother, child, putative father, or the Office of
Recovery Services; or
(b) a voluntary declaration of paternity executed in accordance with
Title 78, Chapter 45e, Voluntary Declaration of Paternity Act.
2) If paternity has been determined or has been acknowledged according to
laws of this state or any other state, the liabilities of the father may be
3rced in the same or other proceedings by:
(a) the mother, child, the Office of Recovery Services, or the public
authority that has furnished or may furnish the reasonable expenses of
pregnancy, confinement, education, necessary support, or funeral expenses; and
(b) other persons including private agencies to the extent that they
have furnished the reasonable expenses of pregnancy, confinement, education, necessary support, or funeral expenses.
) An adjudication of paternity or a voluntary declaration executed in
rdance with Title 78, Chapter 45e, Voluntary Declaration of Paternity Act,
I be filed with the state registrar in accordance with Section 26-2-5.
I A party to an action under this chapter has a continuing obligation to
the court informed of the party's current address.
tory: L. 1965, ch. 158, § 2; 1990, ch.
23; 1994, ch. 127, § 2; 1997, ch. 232,
endment Notes. — The 1997 amendeffective July 1, 1997 substituted "Office

5a-5.

of Recovery Services* for "public authority
chargeable by law with the support of the child"
in Subsection (l)(a); added "the Office of Recovery Services" in Subsection (2)(a); and added
Subsections (3) and (4).

Remedies.

The district court has jurisdiction of an action to establish paternity. All
lies for enforcement of judgments for expenses of pregnancy and confinefor a wife or for education, necessary support, or funeral expenses for
nate children shall apply. The court has continuing jurisdiction to modify
oke a judgment for future education and necessary support. All remedies
Title 78, Chapter 45f, Uniform Interstate Family Support Act, are
ble for enforcement of duties of support under this chapter.
(a) The obligee may enforce his right of support against the obligor and
ie state may proceed on behalf of the obligee or in its own behalf,
irsuant to the provisions of Title 62A, Chapter 11, Recovery Services, to
iforce that right of support against the obligor.
(b) The provisions of Title 62A, Chapter 11, Recovery Services, apply in
[ actions by the state.
(c) Whenever the state commences an action under this chapter, it shall
the duty of the attorney general or the county attorney of the county
lere the obligee resides to represent the state. Neither the attorney
neral nor the county attorney represents or has an attorney-client
ationship with the obligee or the obligor, in carrying out his responsiities under this chapter.
Ipon motion by a party, the court shall issue a temporary order in a
ty action to require the payment of child support pending a determiDf paternity if there is clear and convincing evidence of paternity in the
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form of genetic test results under Section 78-45a-7 or 78-45a-10, or ot
evidence.
(4) The court may enter an order awarding costs, attorney fees, and witr:
fees in the manner prescribed by Section 30-3-3 upon a judgment or acknc
edgment of paternity.
(5) Rule 55, Default Judgment, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, appliei
paternity actions commenced under this chapter.
History: L. 1965, ch. 158, § 5; 1975, ch. 96,
§ 24; 1990, ch. 183, § 60; 1992, ch. 160, § 2;
1993, ch. 137, § 16; 1994, ch. 140, § 16; 1997,
ch. 232, § 75.
Amendment Notes. — The 1997 amendment, effective July 1, 1997, in the last sentence of Subsection (1) substituted "Title 78,
Chapter 45f, Uniform Interstate Family Sup-

port Act" for "Title 77, Chapter 31, Unl
Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act"
substituted "chapter" for "act"; in Subse<
(2)(a) substituted "state" for "Departmer
Human Services"; substituted "state" for
partment" throughout Subsections (2Kb)
(2)(c); added Subsection (3) and made rel
redesignations; and made stylistic change!

78-45a-6.5. Standard of proof.
The standard of proof in a trial to determine paternity is "by a prepom
ance of the evidence."
History: C. 1953, 78-45a-6.5, enacted by
L. 1988, ch. 93, § 1; 1997, ch. 232, § 76.
Amendment Notes. — The 1997 amend-

ment, effective July 1, 1997, rewrote the
tion.

78-45a-7. Authority for genetic testing.
(1) Upon motion of any party to the action, made at a time so as not to di
the proceedings unduly, the court shall order the mother, the child, and
alleged father to submit to genetic testing if the request is supported I
sworn statement by the requesting party:
(a) alleging paternity and setting forth facts establishing a reason,
possibility of the requisite sexual contact between the parties; or
(b) denying paternity and setting forth facts establishing a reason
possibility of the nonexistence of sexual contact between the parties.
(2) The court may, upon its own initiative, order the mother, the child,
the alleged father to submit to genetic testing.
(3) (a) The court shall order genetic testing:
(i) of a type generally acknowledged as reliable by accredita
bodies designated by the federal Secretary of Health and Hui
Services; and
(ii) to be performed by a laboratory approved by such an acci
tation body,
(b) Except as provided in Subsection (6), the cost of genetic testing s
be paid by the party who requested it or shared between the parti
requested by the court, subject to recoupment against the party
challenges the existence or nonexistence of paternity if the result of
genetic test is contrary to the position of the challenger.
(4) Upon request by a party, a court may order a second genetic test
complies with Subsection (3) if paid for in advance by the requesting party
requested within 15 days of the result of the first genetic test being sent tc
last-known address on file under Section 78-45a-2.
(5) If any party refuses to submit to genetic testing, the court may res
the question of paternity against that party, or may enforce its order ii
rights of others and the interests of justice so require.
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(6) The office may request genetic testing under this section and shall pay
r genetic testing it requests subject to recoupment as provided in Section
>A-11-304.1.
History: L. 1965, ch. 158, § 7; 1992, ch.
0, § 3; 1997, ch. 232, § 77.
Vmendment Notes. — The 1997 amendnt, effective July 1, 1997 added "if the resst is supported by a sworn statement by the
[uesting party" in the opening paragraph of

t-45a-8, 78-45a-9.

Subsection (1); added Subsections (l)(a) and
(1Kb); deleted "or upon request made by or on
behalf of any person whose blood is involved"
after "initiative" in Subsection (2); added Subsections (3), (4), and (6) and made related
redesignations; and made stylistic changes.

Repealed.

Repeals. — Laws 1997, ch. 232, § 141 reIs §§ 78-45a-8 and 78-45a-9, as enacted by
/s 1965, ch. 158, §§ 8 and 9, relating to

selection and compensation of experts, effective
July 1, 1997.

-45a-10. Effect of genetic test results.
1) Genetic test results shall be admissible as evidence of paternity without
need for foundation testimony or other proof of authenticity or accuracy if:
(a) of a type generally acknowledged as reliable by accreditation bodies
designated by the federal Secretary of Health and Human Services;
(b) performed by a laboratory approved by such an accreditation body;
and
(c) not objected to with particularity and in writing within 15 days after
the written test results being sent to the parties.
) (a) Upon a motion of a party, a court may receive testimony from genetic
testing experts and others involved in conducting the genetic tests if the
testimony:
(i) is based on a genetic test performed in accordance with Subsection 78-45a-7(3)(a) or 78-45a-7(4); and
(ii) is useful to the court in determining paternity.
(b) Unless a party objects with particularity and in writing within 15
days after the written test results are sent to the last-known address of
that party on file under Section 78-45a-2, testimony received under
Subsection (2)(a) shall be in affidavit form.
(a) A man is presumed to be the natural father of a child if genetic
esting results in a paternity index of at least 150.
(b) A presumption under Subsection (3)(a) may only be rebutted by a
econd genetic test:
(i) that complies with Subsection 78-45a-7(4); and
(ii) results in an exclusion.
If a presumption of paternity established under Subsection (1) is not
ted by a second genetic test under Subsection (2), the court shall issue an
establishing paternity.
Bills for pregnancy, childbirth, and genetic testing are admissible as
ice without requiring third-party foundation testimony and shall constiirima facie evidence of amounts incurred for such services or for testing
lalf of the child.
>ry: C. 1953, 78-45a-10, enacted by L.
h. 232, § 78.
als and Reenactments. — Laws
l. 232, § 78 repeals former § 78-45a-10,

as amended by Laws 1992, ch. 160, § 4, prescribing the effect of genetic test results, and
enacts the present section, effective July 1,
1997.
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78-45a-11.5. Social security number in court records.
The social security number of any individual who is subject to a paternit;
determination shall be placed in the records relating to the matter.
History: C. 1953, 78-45a-11.5, enacted by
L. 1997, ch. 232, § 79.

Effective Dates. — Laws 1997, ch. 232
§ 142 makes the act effective on July 1, 1997

CHAPTER 45e
VOLUNTARY DECLARATION OF
PATERNITY
Section
78-45e-2.

Voluntary declaration of paternity.
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78-45e-3.
78-45e-4.
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78-45e-2. Voluntary declaration of paternity.
(1) (a) A voluntary declaration of paternity filed in compliance with this
chapter establishes a father-child relationship identical to the relationship
established when a child is born to persons married to each other.
(b) When a voluntary declaration of paternity is filed, the liabilities oi
the father include, but are not limited to, the reasonable expense of the
mother's pregnancy and confinement and for the education, necessary
support, and any funeral expenses for the child.
(c) When a father voluntarily declares paternity, his liability for past
amounts due is limited to a period of four years immediately preceding the
date that the voluntary declaration of paternity was filed.
(2) When a voluntary declaration of paternity is filed it shall be recognized
as a basis for a child support order without any further requirement or
proceeding regarding the establishment of paternity.
(3) The voluntary declaration of paternity may be completed and signed any
time after the birth of the child. A voluntary declaration of paternity may not
be executed or filed after consent to or relinquishment for adoption has been
signed.
(4) The voluntary declaration of paternity shall become an amendment to
the original birth certificate. The original certificate and the declaration shall
be marked so as to be distinguishable. The declaration may be included as part
of subsequently issued certified copies of the birth certificate. Alternatively,
electronically issued copies of a certificate may reflect the amended information and the date of amendment only.
(5) The voluntary declaration of paternity shall be in the form prescribed by
the state registrar of vital statistics and shall be accompanied with an
explanation of the alternatives to, the legal consequences of, and the rights and
responsibilities that arise from signing the declaration.
(6) The social security number of any person who is subject to a voluntary
declaration of paternity shall be placed in the records relating to the matter.
History: C. 1953, 78-45e-2, enacted by L.
1994, ch. 127, § 4; 1995, ch. 258, § 16; 1997,
ch. 232, § 80.
Amendment Notes. — The 1997 amend-

ment, effective July 1, 1997 added "and shall be
accompanied..;' in Subsection (5) and added
Subsection (6).

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
True copies of the foregoing were mailed to:
David W. Steffensen
Attorney for Karly Yvette Madsen, a minor child.
2159 South 700 East, Suite 100, SLC UT 84106
Michael E. Day
Attorney for Sheri Marion
45 East Vine Street, Murray
on this, the

day of

